Abstract. The regularization of a convex program is exact if all solutions of the regularized problem are also solutions of the original problem for all values of the regularization parameter below some positive threshold. For a general convex program, we show that the regularization is exact if and only if a certain selection problem has a Lagrange multiplier. Moreover, the regularization parameter threshold is inversely related to the Lagrange multiplier. We use this result to generalize an exact regularization result of Ferris and Mangasarian [Appl. Math. Optim., 23 (1991), pp. 266-273] involving a linearized selection problem. We also use it to derive necessary and sufficient conditions for exact penalization, similar to those obtained by Bertsekas [Math. Programming, 9 (1975), pp. 87-99] and by Bertsekas, Nedić, and Ozdaglar [Convex Analysis and Optimization, Athena Scientific, Belmont, MA, 2003]. When the regularization is not exact, we derive error bounds on the distance from the regularized solution to the original solution set. We also show that existence of a "weak sharp minimum" is in some sense close to being necessary for exact regularization. We illustrate the main result with numerical experiments on the 1 regularization of benchmark (degenerate) linear programs and semidefinite/second-order cone programs. The experiments demonstrate the usefulness of 1 regularization in finding sparse solutions.
Introduction.
A common approach to solving an ill-posed problem-one whose solution is not unique or is acutely sensitive to data perturbations-is to construct a related problem whose solution is well behaved and deviates only slightly from a solution of the original problem. This is known as regularization, and deviations from solutions of the original problem are generally accepted as a trade-off for obtaining solutions with other desirable properties. However, it would be more desirable if solutions of the regularized problem were also solutions of the original problem. Here we present necessary and sufficient conditions for this to hold and study their implications for general convex programs.
Consider the general convex program (P) minimize
where f : R n → R is a convex function, and C ⊆ R n is a nonempty closed convex set. In cases where (P) is ill-posed or lacks a smooth dual, a popular technique is to regularize the problem by adding a convex function to the objective. This yields the regularized problem (P δ ) minimize
subject to x ∈ C, where φ : R n → R is a convex function, and δ is a nonnegative regularization parameter. The regularization function φ may be nonlinear and/or nondifferentiable.
In general, solutions of the regularized problem (P δ ) need not be solutions of (P). (Here and throughout, "solution" is used in lieu of "optimal solution.") We say that the regularization is exact if the solutions of (P δ ) are also solutions of (P) for all values of δ below some positive threshold valueδ. We choose the term exact to draw an analogy with exact penalization that is commonly used for solving constrained nonlinear programs. An exact penalty formulation of a problem can recover a solution of the original problem for all values of the penalty parameter beyond a threshold value. See, for example, [4, 5, 9, 21, 24, 31] and, for more recent discussions, [7, 15] .
Exact regularization can be useful for various reasons. If a convex program does not have a unique solution, exact regularization may be used to select solutions with desirable properties. In particular, Tikhonov regularization [45] , which corresponds to φ(x) = x 2 2 , can be used to select a least two-norm solution. Specialized algorithms for computing least two-norm solutions of linear programs (LPs) have been proposed by [25, 26, 27, 30, 33, 48] , among others. Saunders [42] and Altman and Gondzio [1] use Tikhonov regularization as a tool for influencing the conditioning of the underlying linear systems that arise in the implementation of large-scale interior-point algorithms for LPs. Bertsekas [4, Proposition 4] and Mangasarian [30] use Tikhonov regularization to form a smooth convex approximation of the dual LP.
More recently, there has been much interest in 1 regularization, which corresponds to φ(x) = x| 1 . Recent work related to signal processing has focused on using LPs to obtain sparse solutions (i.e., solutions with few nonzero components) of underdetermined systems of linear equations Ax = b (with the possible additional condition x ≥ 0); for examples, see [13, 12, 14, 18] . In machine learning and statistics, 1 regularization of linear least-squares problems (sometimes called lasso regression) plays a prominent role as an alternative to Tikhonov regularization; for examples, see [19, 44] . Further extensions to regression and maximum likelihood estimation are studied in [2, 41] , among others.
There have been some studies of exact regularization for the case of differentiable φ, mainly for LP [4, 30, 34] , but to our knowledge there has been only one study, by Ferris and Mangasarian [20] , for the case of nondifferentiable φ. However, their analysis is mainly for the case of strongly convex φ, and thus is not applicable to regularization functions such as the one-norm. In this paper, we study exact regularization of the convex program (P) by (P δ ) for a general convex φ.
Central to our analysis is a related convex program that selects solutions of (P) of least φ-value:
where p * denotes the optimal value of (P). We assume a nonempty solution set of (P), which we denote by S, so that p * is finite and (P φ ) is feasible. Clearly, any solution of (P φ ) is also a solution of (P). The converse, however, does not generally hold.
In section 2 we prove our main result: the regularization (P δ ) is exact if and only if the selection problem (P φ ) has a Lagrange multiplier μ * . Moreover, the solution set of (P δ ) coincides with the solution set of (P φ ) for all δ < 1/μ * ; see Theorem 2.1 and Corollary 2.2.
A particular case of special interest is conic programs, which correspond to
where A ∈ R m×n , b ∈ R m , c ∈ R n , and K ⊆ R n is a nonempty closed convex cone. In the further case where K is polyhedral, (P φ ) always has a Lagrange multiplier. Thus we extend a result obtained by Mangasarian and Meyer for LPs [34, Theorem 1] ; their (weaker) result additionally assumes differentiability (but not convexity) of φ on S, and proves that existence of a Lagrange multiplier for (P φ ) implies existence of a common solution x * of (P) and (P δ ) for all positive δ below some threshold. In general, however, (P φ ) need not have a Lagrange multiplier even if C has a nonempty interior. This is because the additional constraint f (x) = c T x ≤ p * may exclude points in the interior of C. We discuss this further in section 2.
Applications.
We present four applications of our main result. The first three show how to extend existing results in convex optimization. The fourth shows how exact regularization can be used in practice.
Linearized selection (section 3). In the case where f is differentiable, C is polyhedral, and φ is strongly convex, Ferris and Mangasarian [20, Theorem 9] show that the regularization (P δ ) is exact if and only if the solution of (P φ ) is unchanged when f is replaced by its linearization at anyx ∈ S. We generalize this result by relaxing the strong convexity assumption on φ; see Theorem 3.2.
Exact penalization (section 4). We show a close connection between exact regularization and exact penalization by applying our main results to obtain necessary and sufficient conditions for exact penalization of convex programs. The resulting conditions are similar to those obtained by Bertsekas [ Error bounds (section 5). We show that in the case where f is continuously differentiable, C is polyhedral, and S is bounded, a necessary condition for exact regularization with any φ is that f has a "weak sharp minimum" [10, 11] over C. In the case where the regularization is not exact, we derive error bounds on the distance from each solution of the regularized problem (P δ ) to S in terms of δ and the growth rate of f on C away from S.
Sparse solutions (section 6). As an illustration of our main result, we apply exact 2. Main results. Ferris and Mangasarian [20, Theorem 7] prove that if the objective function f is linear, then
for anyδ > 0. However, an additional constraint qualification on C is needed to ensure that the set on the left-hand side of (2.1) is nonempty (see [20, Theorem 8] ). The following example shows that the set can be empty:
, K defines the cone of 2 × 2 symmetric positive semidefinite matrices. Clearly K has a nonempty interior, and the solutions have the form
(Note that φ is coercive, but not strictly convex.) Then (P φ ) has the singleton solution set S φ = {(0, 1, 0)}. However, for any δ > 0, (P δ ) has the unique solution
which converges to the solution of (P φ ) as δ → 0, but is never equal to it. Therefore S δ differs from S φ for all δ > 0 sufficiently small. Note that the left-hand side of (2.1) can be empty even when φ is strongly convex and infinitely differentiable. As an example, consider the strongly convex quadratic regularization function
As with (2.3), it can be shown in this case that S δ differs from S φ = {(0, 1, 0)} for all δ > 0 sufficiently small. In particular, (δ/2, 1, δ 2 /4) is feasible for (P δ ), and its objective function value is strictly less than that of (0, 1, 0). Thus the latter cannot be a solution of (P δ ) for any δ > 0.
In general, one can show that as δ → 0, each cluster point of solutions of (P δ ) belongs to S φ . Moreover, there is no duality gap between (P φ ) and its dual because S φ is compact (see [40, Theorem 30.4(i) ]). However, the supremum in the dual problem might not be attained, in which case there would be no Lagrange multiplier for (P φ )-and hence no exact regularization property. Thus, additional constraint qualifications are needed when f is not affine or C is not polyhedral.
The following theorem and corollary are our main results. They show that the regularization (P δ ) is exact if and only if the selection problem (P φ ) has a Lagrange multiplier μ * . Moreover, S δ = S φ for all δ < 1/μ * . Parts of our proof bear similarity to the arguments used by Mangasarian and Meyer [34, Theorem 1] , who consider the two cases μ * = 0 and μ * > 0 separately in proving the "if" direction. However, instead of working with the KKT conditions for (P) and (P δ ), we work with saddlepoint conditions.
Thus x * ∈ S φ , and it follows that S ∩ S δ ⊆ S φ . Part (b). Assume that there exists a Lagrange multiplier μ * for (P φ ). We consider the two cases μ * = 0 and μ * > 0 in turn. First, suppose that μ * = 0. Then, for any solution x * of (P φ ),
or, equivalently,
Also, x * is feasible for (P φ ), so x * ∈ S. Thus
Multiplying the inequality in (2.4) by δ ≥ 0 and adding it to the above inequality yields
Thus x * ∈ S δ for all δ ∈ [0, ∞). Second, suppose that μ * > 0. Then, for any solution x * of (P φ ),
Also, x * is feasible for (P φ ), so that x * ∈ S. Therefore
Then, for any λ ∈ [0, 1], multiplying the above two inequalities by λ and 1 − λ, respectively, and summing them yields Part (c). Assume that there existsδ > 0 such that S ∩ Sδ = ∅. Then, for any x * ∈ S ∩ Sδ, we have x * ∈ Sδ, and thus
By Part (a), x * ∈ S φ . This implies that any x ∈ S φ attains the minimum because φ(x) = φ(x * ) and f (x) = p * . Therefore 1/δ is a Lagrange multiplier for (P φ ). By (x) . Assume that there exists aδ > 0 such that S ∩ Sδ = ∅. Fix any x * ∈ S ∩ Sδ. For any δ ∈ (0,δ) and any x ∈ C \ S, we have
Because 0 < δ/δ < 1, this implies that
Because x * ∈ C, this shows that x ∈ C \S cannot be a solution of (P δ ), and so S δ ⊆ S, as desired.
Theorem 2.1 shows that existence of a Lagrange multiplier μ * for (P φ ) is necessary and sufficient for exact regularization of (P) by (P δ ) for all 0 < δ < 1/μ * . Coerciveness of φ on S is needed only to ensure that S φ is nonempty. If δ = 1/μ * , then S δ need not be a subset of S. For example, suppose that 
Conic programs.
Conic programs (CPs) correspond to (P) with f and C given by (1.1). They include several important problem classes. LPs correspond to K = R n + (the nonnegative orthant); SOCPs correspond to
(a product of second-order cones); SDPs correspond to K = S n + (the cone of symmetric positive semidefinite n × n real matrices). CPs are discussed in detail in [3, 8, 35, 38] , among others.
It is well known that when K is polyhedral, the selection problem (P φ ), with f and C given by (1.1), must have a Lagrange multiplier [40, Theorem 28.2] . In this important case, Corollary 2.2 immediately yields the following exact-regularization result for polyhedral CPs. , which additionally assumes differentiability (though not convexity) of φ on S and proves a weaker result that there exists a common solution x * ∈ S ∩ S δ for all positive δ below some threshold. If S is furthermore bounded, then an "excision lemma" of Robinson [39, Lemma 3.5] can be applied to show that S δ ⊆ S for all positive δ below some threshold. This result is still weaker than Corollary 2.3, however.
Relaxing the assumptions on the regularization function.
The assumption that φ is coercive on S and is bounded from below on C (Assumption 1.2) ensures that the selection problem (P φ ) and the regularized problem (P δ ) have solutions. This assumption is preserved under the introduction of slack variables for linear inequality constraints. For example, if C = {x ∈ K | Ax ≤ b} for some closed convex set K, A ∈ R m×n , and b ∈ R m , theñ
also satisfies Assumption 1.2. Hereφ(x, s) depends only on x. Can Assumption 1.2 be relaxed? Suppose that φ(x) depends only on a subset of coordinates x J and is coercive with respect to x J , where x J = (x j ) j∈J and J ⊆ {1, . . . , n}. Using the assumption that (P) has a feasible point x * , it is readily seen that (P δ ) has a solution with respect to x J for each δ > 0, i.e., the minimization in (P δ ) is attained at some x J . For an LP (f linear and C polyhedral) it can be shown that (P δ ) has a solution with respect to all coordinates of x. However, in general this need not be true, even for an SOCP. An example is
Here, p * = 0 (since x 2 1 + x 2 2 − x 2 ≥ 0 always) and solutions are of the form (0, ξ, ξ) for all ξ ≥ 0. For any δ > 0, (P δ ) has optimal value of zero (achieved by setting
2 , and taking x 2 → ∞) but has no solution. In general, if we define
then it can be shown, using convex analysis results [40] , that f is convex and lower semicontinuous-i.e., the epigraph of f is convex and closed. Then (P δ ) is equivalent to
with φ viewed as a function of x J . Thus, we can in some sense reduce this case to the one we currently consider. Note that f may not be real-valued, but this does not pose a problem with the proof of Theorem 2.1. [20] develop a related exactregularization result for the special case where f is differentiable, C is polyhedral, and φ is strongly convex. They show that (P δ ) is an exact regularization if the solution set of the selection problem (P φ ) is unchanged when f is replaced by its linearization at anyx ∈ S. In this section we show how Theorem 2.1 and Corollary 2.2 can be applied to generalize this result. We begin with a technical lemma, closely related to some results given by Mangasarian [32] .
Linearized selection. Ferris and Mangasarian
Lemma 3.1. Suppose that f is differentiable on R n and constant on the line segment joining two points x * andx in R n . Then
Moreover, ∇f is constant on the line segment. Proof. Because f is convex differentiable and is constant on the line segment joining
Fix any x ∈ R n . Taking y =x + α(x −x) with α > 0 yields
Dividing both sides by α and then taking α → 0 yields in the limit
Switchingx and x * in the above argument yields an inequality in the opposite direction. Thus (3.1) holds, as desired.
By taking x = α(∇f (x * ) − ∇f (x)) in (3.1) and letting α → ∞, we obtain that ∇f (x * ) − ∇f (x) 2 2 = 0 and hence ∇f (x * ) = ∇f (x). This shows that ∇f is constant on the line segment.
Suppose that f is differentiable at everyx ∈ S, and consider a variant of the selection problem (P φ ) in which the constraint is linearized aboutx:
Lemma 3.1 shows that the feasible set of (P φ,x ) is the same for allx ∈ S. Since f is convex, the feasible set of (P φ,x ) contains S, which is the feasible set of (P φ ). Let S φ,x denote the solution set of (P φ,x ). In general S φ = S φ,x . In the case where φ is strongly convex and C is polyhedral, Ferris and Mangasarian [20, Theorem 9] show that exact regularization (i.e., S φ = S δ for all δ > 0 sufficiently small) holds if and only if S φ = S φ,x . By using Theorem 2.1, Corollary 2.2, and Lemma 3.1, we can generalize this result by relaxing the assumption that φ is strongly convex.
for allx ∈ S.
(b) If C is polyhedral and (3.3) holds, then there exists aδ > 0 such that
Proof. Part (a). Suppose that there exists aδ > 0 such that Sδ = S φ . Then by Corollary 2.2, μ * := 1/δ is a Lagrange multiplier for (P φ ), and for any
Because φ and f are real-valued and convex, x * and μ * satisfy the optimality condition
Then x * satisfies the KKT condition for the linearized selection problem
and is therefore a solution of this problem. By Lemma 3.1, the feasible set of this problem remains unchanged if we replace ∇f (x * )
The choice of x * was arbitrary, and so S φ ⊆ S φ,x . Part (b). Suppose that C is polyhedral and (3.3) holds. By Lemma 3.1, the solution set of (P φ,x ) remains unchanged if we replace ∇f (x)
The resulting problem (3.5) is linearly constrained and therefore has a Lagrange multiplierμ ∈ R. Moreover,μ is independent of x * . By Corollary 2.2(a), the problem
has the same solution set as (3.5) for all μ * >μ. The necessary and sufficient optimality condition for this convex program is
Because (3.3) holds, x * satisfies this optimality condition. Thus (3.4) holds for all μ * >μ or, equivalently, x * ∈ S δ for all δ ∈ (0, 1/μ). Becauseμ is independent of x * , this shows that
In the case where φ is strongly convex, S φ and S φ,x are both singletons, so (3.3) is equivalent to S φ = S φ,x for allx ∈ S. Thus, when C is also polyhedral, Theorem 3.2 reduces to [20, Theorem 9] . Note that in Theorem 3.2(b) the polyhedrality of C is needed only to ensure the existence of a Lagrange multiplier for (3.5) and can be relaxed by assuming an appropriate constraint qualification. In particular, if C is given by inequality constraints, then it suffices that (P φ,x ) has a feasible point that strictly satisfies all nonlinear constraints [40, Theorem 28.2] .
Naturally, (3.3) holds if f is linear. Thus Theorem 3.2(b) is false if we drop the polyhedrality assumption on C, as we can find examples of convex coercive φ, linear f , and closed convex (but not polyhedral) C for which exact regularization fails; see example (2.2).
Exact penalization.
In this section we show a close connection between exact regularization and exact penalization by applying Corollary 2.2 to obtain necessary and sufficient conditions for exact penalization of convex programs. Consider the convex program
where φ, g 1 , . . . , g m are real-valued convex functions defined on R n , and C ⊆ R n is a nonempty closed convex set. The penalized form of (4.1) is
where σ is a positive penalty parameter and P : R m → [0, ∞) is a convex function having the property that P (u) = 0 if and only if u ≤ 0; see [7, section 7.3] . A well-known example of such a penalty function is
The conjugate and polar functions of P [40, subsections 12, 15] are defined, respectively, by
.
• (w) equals the q-norm of w whenever w ≥ 0, where 1/p + 1/q = 1. The following lemma gives key properties of these functions that are implicit in the analysis of [7, section 7.3] .
Lemma 4.1.
Proof. Part (a). Fix any u, v ∈ R m with u < v, and define
We have u + α(v − u) < 0 for all α < 0 sufficiently negative, in which case π(α) = 0. Because π is convex, this implies that π is nondecreasing and hence
, . . . , m}, then by letting u i → −∞ and setting all other components of u to zero, we obtain w
m (with equality holding when u = 0). Therefore P * (w) = 0. Proof. Set f (x) = P g(x) for all x ∈ R n . By the convexity of g 1 , . . . , g m , P , and Lemma 4.1(a), f is a convex function and thus (4.2) is a convex program. Moreover, any feasible point x * of (4.1) is a solution of (P) with optimal value p * = 0. Accordingly, we identify (4.2) with (P δ ) (where φ is the regularization function and δ = 1/σ is the regularization parameter), and we identify the problem
with (P φ ). Assumptions 1.1 and 1.2 are satisfied because (4.1) has a nonempty compact solution set.
A primal-dual solution pair (x * , y * ) of (4.1) satisfies the KKT conditions
By [40, Theorem 23.5] , the subdifferential of P at u has the expression ∂P (u) = {w | w 
We can then express the KKT conditions for (4.4) as (4.6)
By scaling μ and w by P • (w) and 1/P • (w), respectively, and using the positive homogeneous property of P
• , we can without loss of generality assume that P • (w) = 1 in (4.6). Then, upon comparing (4.5) and (4.6), we see that they are equivalent in the sense that ( . Theorem 4.2 shows that the existence of Lagrange multipliers y * with P • (y * ) < ∞ is necessary and sufficient for exact penalization. There has been much study of sufficient conditions for exact penalization; see, e.g., [4] , [5, Proposition 4.1], and [9] . The results in [4, Propositions 1 and 2] assume the existence of Lagrange multipliers y * and, for the case of separable P (i.e., P (u) = i P i (u i )), prove necessary and sufficient conditions on P and y * for exact penalization. For separable P , the condition Although our results for exact regularization can be used to deduce results for exact penalization, the reverse direction does not appear possible. In particular, applying exact penalization to the selection problem (P φ ) yields a penalized problem very different from (P δ ).
Error bounds and weak sharp minimum.
Even when exact regularization cannot be achieved, we can still estimate the distance from S δ to S in terms of δ and the growth rate of f away from S. We study this type of error bound in this section.
Proof. Part (a). Fix any x * ∈ S and anyδ > 0. For any δ ∈ (0,δ] and
and thus φ(x * ) ≥ φ(x δ ). Using φ(x δ ) ≥ inf x∈C φ(x), we have, similarly, that
This shows that ∪ 0<δ≤δ S δ ⊆ {x ∈ C | φ(x) ≤ β, f (x) ≤ β} for some β ∈ R. Since φ, f , and C have no nonzero recession direction in common (see Assumptions 1.1 and 1.2), the second set is bounded and therefore so is the first set. Part (b). For any δ > 0 and
which implies that
Because φ is convex and real-valued,
for some η δ ∈ ∂φ(x * δ ). Combining the above two inequalities yields
By Part (a), x δ lies in a bounded set for all δ > 0, so x * δ lies in a bounded subset of S for all δ > 0. Then η δ lies in a bounded set [40, Theorem 24.7] , so that η δ 2 is uniformly bounded. This proves the desired bound.
Error bounds of the form (5.1) have been much studied, especially in the cases of linear growth (γ = 1) and quadratic growth (γ = 2); see [6, 10, 11, 28, 29, 46] and references therein. In general, it is known that (5.1) holds for some τ > 0 and γ ≥ 1 whenever f is analytic and C is bounded [28, Theorem 2.1].
Theorem 5.1 does not make much use of the convexity of f and φ, and it readily extends to nonconvex f and φ. In the case of γ = 1 in (5.1) (i.e., f has a "weak sharp minimum" over C), Theorem 5.1(b) implies that dist(x δ , S) = 0 for all x δ ∈ S δ -i.e., S δ ⊆ S, whenever δ < 1/τ . In this case, then, S δ = S φ whenever δ < 1/τ and S δ = ∅. This gives another exact-regularization result.
The following result shows that it is nearly necessary for f to have a weak sharp minimum over C in order for there to be exact regularization by any strongly convex quadratic regularization function. ( x ∈ R n ) and a scalarδ > 0 for which
and every cluster point (
If case (ii) occurs, then C is not polyhedral, and for anyx ∈ S,
Proof. Suppose that there does not exist τ > 0 such that (5.1) holds with γ = 1. Then there exists a sequence 
Note that {x
k } need not converge to x * or even be bounded. Now, consider the auxiliary sequence
and f is continuously differentiable, (5.4) and y k − x k → 0 yield, in the limit,
where the third equality uses (5.5) and v * 2 = 1. Thus
Therefore, if case (ii) does not occur, then case (i) must occur.
Suppose that case (ii) occurs. First, we claim that, for anyx ∈ S,
Fix anyx ∈ S. Because ∇f (x) T (x −x) = 0 for all x ∈ S, this yields (5.3). Next, we claim that C cannot be polyhedral. If C were polyhedral, then the minimization in (5.3) would be an LP, for which weak sharp minimum holds. Then there would exist τ > 0 such that
Because f is convex and thus
for all x ∈ C, this would imply that (5.1) holds with γ = 1, contradicting our assumption.
An example of case (ii) occurring in Theorem 5.2 is
Here S = {(0, 0)}, p * = 0, and
1 If this were false, then there would existx ∈ S and x ∈ C \ S such that ∇f (x) 
It is straightforward to check that (0, 0) does not satisfy the necessary optimality conditions for (P δ ) for all δ > 0. This raises the question of whether case (ii) is subsumed by case (i) when C is not polyhedral. In section 8, we give an example showing that the answer is "no."
6. Sparse solutions. In this section we illustrate a practical application of Corollary 2.2. Our aim is to find sparse solutions of LPs and CPs that may not have unique solutions. To this end, we let φ(x) = x 1 , which clearly satisfies the required Assumption 1.2. (In general, however, some components of x may be more significant or be at different scales, in which case we may not wish to regularize all components or regularize them equally.)
Regularization based on the one-norm has been used in many applications, with the goal of obtaining sparse or even sparsest solutions of underdetermined systems of linear equations and least-squares problems. Some recent examples include [14, 16, 17, 18] .
The AMPL model and data files and the MATLAB scripts used to generate all of the numerical results presented in the following subsections can be obtained at http://www.cs.ubc.ca/∼mpf/exactreg/.
Sparse solutions of linear programs.
For underdetermined systems of linear equations Ax = b that arise in fields such as signal processing, the studies in [13, 14, 18] in order to obtain a sparse solution. This problem can be recast as an LP and be solved efficiently. The sparsest solution is given by minimizing the so-called zeronorm, x 0 , which counts the number of nonzero components in x. However, the combinatorial nature of this minimization makes it computationally intractable for all but the simplest instances. Interestingly, there exist reasonable conditions under which a solution of (6.1) is a sparsest solution; see [13, 18] . Following this approach, we use Corollary 2.2 as a guide for obtaining least onenorm solutions of a generic LP,
by solving its regularized version,
The vectors l and u are lower and upper bounds on x. In many of the numerical tests given below, the exact 1 regularized solution of (6.2) (given by (6.3) for smallenough values of δ) is considerably sparser than the solution obtained by solving (6.2) directly. In each instance, we solve the regularized and unregularized problems with the same interior-point solver. We emphasize that, with an appropriate choice of the regularization parameter δ, the solution of the regularized LP is also a solution of the original LP. We use two sets of test instances in our numerical experiments. The instances of the first set are randomly generated using a degenerate LP generator described in [23] . Those of the second set are derived from the infeasible LPs in the NETLIB collection (http://www.netlib.org/lp/infeas/). Both sets of test instances are further described in subsections 6.1.1-6.1.2.
We follow the same procedure for each test instance. First, we solve the LP (6.2) to obtain an unregularized solution x * and the optimal value p * := c T x * . Next, we solve (P φ ), reformulated as an LP, to obtain a Lagrange multiplier μ * and the threshold valueδ = 1/μ * . Finally, we solve (6.3) with δ :=δ/2, reformulated as an LP, to obtain a regularized solution x * δ . We use the log-barrier interior-point algorithm implemented in CPLEX 9.1 to solve each LP. The default CPLEX options are used, except for crossover = 0 and comptol = 1e-10. Setting crossover = 0 forces CPLEX to use the interior-point algorithm only and to not "cross over" to find a vertex solution. In general, we expect the interior-point algorithm to find the analytic center of the solution set (see [47, Theorems 2.16 and 2.17]), which tends to be less sparse than vertex solutions. The comptol option tightens CPLEX's convergence tolerance from its default of 1e-8 to its smallest allowable setting. We do not advocate such a tight tolerance in practice, but the higher accuracy aids in computing the sparsity of a computed solution, which we determine as
where = 10 −8 is larger than the specified convergence tolerance.
6.1.1. Randomly generated LPs. Six dual-degenerate LPs were constructed using Gonzaga's MATLAB generator [23] . This MATLAB program accepts as inputs the problem size and the dimensions of the optimal primal and dual faces, D p and D d , respectively. Gonzaga shows that these quantities must satisfy
The six LPs are constructed with parameters n = 1000, m = 100, D d = 0, and various levels of D p set as 0%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80%, and 100% of the maximum of 899 (given by (6.5)). The instances are, respectively, labeled random-0, random-20, random-40, and so on. Table 6 .1 summarizes the results. We confirm that in each instance the optimal values of the unregularized and regularized problems are nearly identical (at least to within the specified tolerance), so each regularized solution is exact. Except for the "control" instance random-0, the regularized solution x * δ has a strictly lower one-norm and is considerably sparser than the unregularized solution x * .
Infeasible LPs.
The second set of test instances is derived from a subset of the infeasible NETLIB LPs. For each infeasible LP, we discard the original objective and instead form the problem
and its regularized counterpart 
random-0 2.5e−13 1.0e−13 9.1e+01 → 9.1e+01 100 → 100 1.5e−04 random- 20 5.6e−13 6.6e The unregularized problem (P inf ) models the plausible situation where we wish to fit a set of infeasible equations in the least one-norm sense. But because the one-norm is not strictly convex or the equations are underdetermined, a solution of (P inf ) may not be unique, and the regularized problem (P inf δ ) is used to further select a sparse solution.
The following infeasible NETLIB LPs were omitted because CPLEX returned an error message during the solution of (P inf ) or (P inf δ ): lpi-bgindy, lpi-cplex2, lpi-gran, lpi-klein1, lpi-klein2, lpi-klein3, lpi-qual, lpi-refinery, and lpi-vol1. Table 6 .2 summarizes the results. We can see that the regularized solution x * δ is exact (i.e., c
and has a one-norm lower than or equal to that of the unregularized solution x * in all instances. In twelve of the twenty instances, x * δ is sparser than x * . In five of the instances, they have the same sparsity. In three of the instances (lpi-galenet, lpi-itest6, and lpi-woodinfe), x * δ is actually less sparse, even though its one-norm is lower. 6.2. Sparse solutions of semidefinite/second-order cone programs. In section 6.1 we used Corollary 2.2 to find sparse solutions of LPs. In this section, we report our numerical experience in finding sparse solutions of SDPs and SOCPs that may not have unique solutions. These are conic programs (P) with f and C given by (1.1), and K being the Cartesian product of real space, orthant, second-order cones, and semidefinite cones.
The regularized problem (P δ ) can be put in the conic form
where e is the vector of ones. The selection problem (P φ ) can also be put in conic form:
As in section 6.1, we first solve (P) to obtain x * and the optimal value p * := c T x * . Then (6.7) is solved to obtain Lagrange multiplier μ * and the corresponding threshold valueδ := 1/μ * . Finally, we solve (6.6) with δ =δ/2 to obtain x * δ . All three problems-(P), (6.6), and (6.7)-are solved using the MATLAB toolbox SeDuMi (version 1.05) [43] , which is a C implementation of a log-barrier primal-dual interiorpoint algorithm for solving SDP/SOCP. The test instances are drawn from the DI-MACS Implementation Challenge library [37] , a collection of nontrivial medium-tolarge SDP/SOCP arising from applications. We omit those instances for which either (P) is infeasible (e.g., filtinf1) or if one of (P), (6.6), or (6.7) cannot be solved because of insufficient memory (e.g., torusg3-8). All runs were performed on a PowerPC G5 with 2GB of memory running MATLAB 7.3b. Table 6 .3 summarizes the results. For most of the instances, SeDuMi finds only an inaccurate solution (info.numerr=1) for at least one of (P), (6.6), or (6.7). For most instances, however, SeDuMi also finds a value of μ * that seems reasonable. In some instances (nb_L2_bessel, nql30, nql80, qssp30, qssp60, qssp180, sch_100_100_scal, sch_200_100_scal, truss8), the computed multiplier μ * is quite large relative to the solution accuracy, and yet c
* in the first three significant digits; this suggests that the regularization is effectively exact. For nb_L2, sch_100_50_scal, and sch_100_100_orig, the discrepancies between c The regularized solution x * δ has a one-norm lower than or equal to that of the unregularized solution x * in all instances except hinf12, where x * δ 1 is 1% higher (this small difference does not appear in Table 6 .3). Solution sparsity is measured by the zero-norm defined in (6.4) , where is based on the relative optimality gap
of the computed solution of (6.6). For 52% of the instances, the regularized solution is sparser than the unregularized solution. For 28% of the instances, the solutions have the same sparsity. For the remaining six instances, the regularized solution is actually less sparse, even though its one-norm is lower (nb_L2_bessel, sch_100_50_s, sch_100_100_o) or the same (hinf12, sch_50_50_o, sch_50_50_s). SeDuMi implements an interior-point algorithm, so it is likely to find the analytic center of the solution set of (P). The selection problem (6.7) is generally much harder to solve than (P) or (6.6). For example, on nb_L2_bessel, SeDuMi took 18, 99, and 16 iterations to solve (P), (6.7), and (6.6), respectively, and on truss8 SeDuMi took, respectively, 24, 117, and 35 iterations. This seems to indicate that regularization is more efficient than solving the selection problem as a method for finding sparse solutions.
7. Discussion. We see from the numerical results in section 6 that regularization can provide an effective way of selecting a solution with desirable properties, such as sparsity. However, finding the threshold valueδ for exact regularization entails first solving (P) to obtain p * , and then solving (P φ ) to obtain μ * and settingδ = 1/μ * ; see Corollary 2.2. Can we find a δ <δ from (P) without also solving (P φ )? Consider the case of a CP, in which f and C have the form (1.1). Suppose that a value of δ <δ has been guessed (withδ unknown), and a solution x * of the regularized problem (P δ ) is obtained. By Corollary 2.2, x * is also a solution of (P φ ). Suppose also that there exist Lagrange multipliers y * ∈ R m and z * ∈ K * for (P), where K * is the dual cone of K given by
Then (y * , z * ) satisfy, among other conditions,
Suppose, furthermore, that there exist Lagrange multipliers y * φ ∈ R m , z * φ ∈ K * , and
Then, analogous to the proof of Theorem 2.1, we can construct Lagrange multipliers for (P δ ) as follows: * is indeed an exact solution. In practice, if it were prohibitively expensive to solve (P) and (P φ ), we might adopt an approach suggested by Lucidi [27] and Mangasarian [33] for Tikhonov regularization. They suggest solving the regularized problem successively with decreasing values δ 1 > δ 2 > · · · . If successive regularized solutions do not change for δ ranging over different orders of magnitude, then it is likely that a correct regularization parameter has been obtained. We note that in many instances, the threshold values δ shown in Tables 6.1 would cover 85% of the these cases.
Appendix.
In this appendix, we give an example of f and C that satisfy the assumptions of Theorem 5.2 and for which weak sharp minimum fails to hold and yet exact regularization holds for φ(x) = x − x where C k = {x ∈ R 3 | x 1 − (k − 1)x 2 − k 2 x 3 ≤ 1/k}. Each C k is a half-space in R 3 , so C is a closed convex set. Moreover, C is bounded and nonempty (since 0 ∈ C); see Because x * ∈ C and f δ is strictly convex for δ ∈ (0,δ], it is implied that x * = arg min x∈C f δ (x) for all δ ∈ (0,δ]. Hence exact regularization holds.
